Greater skill of active investment managers can mean less fee revenue in a general equilibrium. Although more-skilled managers earn more revenue than less-skilled managers, greater skill for active managers overall can imply less revenue for their industry. Greater skill allows managers to identify mispriced securities more accurately and thereby make better portfolio choices. Greater skill also means, however, that active management corrects prices better and thus reduces managers' return opportunities. The latter effect can outweigh managers' better portfolio choices in equilibrium. Investors then rationally allocate less to active funds and more to index funds if active management is more skilled.
Introduction
Active investment managers seek to outperform a passive benchmark portfolio by identifying and trading securities likely to over-or under-perform. In exchange for doing so, the managers are compensated by fees their investors pay. The fees are supported by active managers' investment profits, in excess of what investing in the benchmark would produce. Given the alternative of investing in the passive benchmark, rational investors do not consistently invest with active managers whose fees are not covered by investment profits.
Should active managers produce greater investment profits, and thus receive more fee revenue, if they are more skilled? A more-skilled manager should receive more fee revenue than a less-skilled manager, but that is not the whole story. There are many active managers. What if most of them become more skilled? Then, for example, a stock that is truly underpriced is more likely to be identified correctly as such by active managers, and that stock is more likely to be bought by them. This collective higher demand for the stock raises the price managers pay for it, reducing the investment profit they make from buying it. That is the negative effect of skill on profits, working against the positive effect of better identifying the right stocks to buy. Of course the same opposing effects of skill apply to overpriced stocks, raising the chances such stocks are correctly identified but reducing the investment profits from under-weighting or shorting them.
What is the outcome of the opposing skill effects for active managers' investment profits, and thus fee revenue? The answer can go either way, with greater skill producing either more revenue or less for the active management industry. For seemingly plausible scenarios explored here, greater skill brings lower fee revenue in a general equilibrium that captures the effects of skill on stocks' prices.
The model essentially extends Berk and Green (2004) to a general equilibrium by introducing a universe of many stocks, whose prices are influenced by the portfolio demands of many competing active managers. Otherwise the model has familiar features. Chief among them, as in Berk and Green (2004) , is that all of the benchmark-beating investment profit produced by active managers is captured as fee revenue, so their investors earn zero net alpha. In equilibrium, investors are indifferent between putting their last incremental dollar of stock-market investment into an active fund versus a passive index fund, as both funds offer the same expected benchmark-adjusted return. mispricing and hence fee revenue.
To address the pricing effects, I specify additional features of the market and derive a general equilibrium. For active management in aggregate to beat the market benchmark, before costs and fees, other market participants must underperform that benchmark (e.g., Sharpe (1991) ). The potentially underperforming segment is typically assumed to comprise "noise" traders whose asset demands deviate exogenously from those consistent with rational assessments of fundamental values. I include such noise traders in the model. The distribution of the stock-specific distortions introduced by noise traders for a large cross section of stocks is flexibly characterized by a single parameter, following Stambaugh (2014) . Unlike that study, I maintain for simplicity the zero-net-alpha assumption for active funds, thereby extending the Berk and Green (2004) model to a general equilibrium.
For the general equilibrium model, I specify two exogenous dimensions along which managers make valuation errors that impair skill. The first dimension allows stock-specific distortions reflected in noise-traders' demands to arise in the beliefs of active managers to some extent as well. The motivation here is that the noise-trader demands might reflect pervasive sentiment about individual stocks to which professional managers are also somewhat susceptible. Such a scenario seems motivated, for example, by the empirical evidence of Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo, (2011) , Akbas, Armstrong, Sorescu, and Subrahmanyam (2015) , Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) , and DeVault, Sias, and Starks (2018) . The second dimension of valuation errors is idiosyncratic across managers, reflecting manager-specific limitations and mistakes.
Active management corrects prices less when skill is impaired by either a partial echoing of noise-trader demands or by manager-specific errors. Not surprisingly, the more that managers' active positions echo noise-trader demands, the less that establishing those active positions corrects the mispricing that noise traders originate. Manager-specific errors wash out across managers and do not affect the mispricing of one asset relative to another. At the same time, however, the overall aggressiveness of an individual manager's positions is limited by trading costs. The more such positions across individual stocks reflect managerspecific errors, which wash out of aggregate active positions, the less aggressive the aggregate positions become, and the less prices get corrected.
3

Model assumptions
The model considers a single investment period. Active managers identify and exploit opportunities to outperform the market benchmark by having their weights on individual stocks deviate from those of the benchmark. The ultimate objective of the active managers is to maximize the fee revenue received from the investors they attract. There are many managers, acting competitively, each taking stock prices as given. Each manager incurs trading costs when deviating from benchmark stock weights. At the beginning of the period, manager j sets a proportional fee rate equal to f (j) . Investors then invest in aggregate the dollar amount W (j) with the manager, whose fee revenue is thus
Trading costs and decreasing returns to scale
The trading costs faced by active managers are convex in the amount traded. Specifically, for any manager, I assume the dollar cost C i of trading dollar amount D i of stock i is
where δ i is the fraction of stock i's total market capitalization represented by D i , and c is a constant. In other words, the proportional trading cost is linear in the amount traded.
These costs represent compensation to liquidity-providing intermediaries for taking shortlived positions to facilitate the ultimate market clearing in a stock between managers and noise traders. In this interpretation, the trading cost is not to be viewed as a manager-specific price impact, such that if many other managers independently produce similar price impacts, the sum of such impacts aggregates to an implausibly large total price effect. Instead, one might imagine many intermediaries accessing different sources of liquidity or acting at slightly different times. This specification of trading costs also appears in Stambaugh (2014) and Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2019) .
Convex trading costs imply active managers face decreasing returns to scale. Larger funds trade larger dollar amounts, representing larger fractions of stocks' market capitalizations, so proportional trading costs increase in fund size. An assumption of fund-level decreasing returns to scale is central to the model of Berk and Green (2004) . 4
Zero net alpha for funds
Let α (j)
A denote active fund j's alpha net of costs and fees, defined with respect to investors' passive alternative, the market index fund. As in Berk and Green (2004) , I assume investors allocate money to an active fund up to point at which additional investment in the fund, given decreasing returns to scale, would drive α (j)
A below zero. That is, the equilibrium size of a given active fund j is such that
(2) Berk and Green (2004) impose equation (2) in analyzing a partial equilibrium, with the sources of an active fund's benchmark-beating gross returns not modeled. I begin by imposing the same zero-alpha condition in a partial equilibrium. Later, in a general equilibrium with noise traders, I link the sources of the fund's gross returns to departures of endogenously determined prices from their fundamental values.
The most natural assumption motivating α (j) A = 0 is that investors are risk neutral. In that setting, any deviation of the fund's expected net return from that of the passive benchmark prompts a flow of investor money to or from the fund such that the deviation is removed.
1
When investors are instead risk averse, equation (2) is better viewed as an approximation to the equilibrium. The reason is that if active managers on the whole possess skill to identify mispriced securities, then the departures of active managers' portfolios from benchmark weights are at least somewhat correlated across managers. The result of this correlation is that a non-diversifiable risk component, uncorrelated with the benchmark return, is present in active fund returns.
2 This additional risk will generally not be borne by risk-averse investors without compensation, requiring α
3 This point is made in a partial equilibrium by Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) and in a general equilibrium by Stambaugh (2014) .
Calibrations in both studies, however, suggest that violations of equation (2) are likely to be modest in economic magnitude. I impose the zero-alpha condition here for tractability, especially when considering skill differences across managers. Stambaugh (2017) provides a 1 Indeed, in an earlier version of their published study, Berk and Green (2003, p. 6) assume that investors are risk neutral.
2 If risk-averse investors seek to maximize their Sharpe ratios, for example, then the active-management alpha relevant to them is the difference between the expected net return and beta times the expected market benchmark return. The mean-zero tracking error accompanying this alpha is then uncorrelated with the benchmark return. In keeping with a risk-neutral motivation, the alpha in equation (2) is instead defined below as the simple difference between the fund's expected net return and the expected benchmark return.
3 Recall that this alpha is defined with respect to the market benchmark as opposed to the stochastic discount factor pricing all individual assets. related analysis in a risk-averse setting that delivers the same message as this study about the effect of greater industry-level skill.
Stocks
The stock market contains N stocks, and the total supply of each stock equals one share.
Stock i has share price p i at the beginning of the investment period and value (including dividends) equal to x i at the end of the period . The market portfolio has total end-ofperiod value x m = N i=1 x i . There are N shares in the market portfolio, each with price
Let µ denote one plus the required discount rate, equal across stocks in the risk-neutral setting. Letx i equal the correct expected value of x i , in the sense that if
then stock i is priced at its fundamental value. I assume the overall market is fairly priced,
That is, active managers can profit only through stock picking, not market timing or overall asset allocation. The expected difference in return between stock i and the market benchmark is therefore equal to
Fund managers' expectations
Manager j expects end-of-period value for stock i to bex
I assume the manager does not misvalue the overall market, however, so
Instead of the true alpha in equation (5), manager j's assessed alpha for stock i is thereforẽ
with the manager's assessed fair price for the stock being
I do not assume managers use their available information correctly in forming rational expectations about the payoffs on individual stocks. The difference betweenx
can reflect a failure to condition correctly on whatever information is available. In that sense, a more skilled manager simply makes smaller conditioning mistakes. While not a necessary assumption, one interpretation ofx i is that it represents the correct conditional expectation given a common signal about stock i that is observed by all of the managers, each of whom pays a cost to be a manager. Such an interpretation is somewhat analogous to having perfectly skilled managers, for whomx (j) i =x i , correspond to the Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) rational informed agents who pay a cost to observe a common informative signal.
A common-signal scenario is motivated, for example, by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation Fair Disclosure, which seeks to reduce disparities across investors in the information released by firms.
The distinction between exercising skill versus acquiring costly information can be illustrated via the findings of McLean and Pontiff (2016) . That study's evidence suggests arbitrageurs (corresponding to fund managers in the current setting), upon the publication of academic studies, learn how various stock characteristics can be used to produce alpha by buying some stocks and selling others. The stock characteristics are generally publicly or rather cheaply available, as are the academic studies. In the post-publication scenario supported by the study, arbitrageurs don't condition on additional costly information but instead simply condition better on information (stock characteristics) already at hand.
Define manager j's active weight in stock i as
where φ
(j)
A,i is stock i's weight in the manager's portfolio, and φ m,i is stock i's weight in the market portfolio. Note that
Let g (j) denote the true gross alpha on the manager's portfolio, given by
and defineg (j) asg
which is the gross alpha on the portfolio implied by theα The specifics of this assumption involve the following. Consider the fund's true net alpha,
given by
where C (j) equals the fund's total trading cost,
obtained by applying equation (1). I assume that investors correctly assess α
A and that they invest W (j) with the fund such that equation (2) is satisfied. I also assume fund managers know that their equilibrium fund sizes are determined as such, and thus managers are not surprised by the amount of fee revenue they receive. That revenue is determined by setting the right-hand side of equation (12) equal to zero (by equation (2)), substituting from equation (13) for C (j) , solving for W (j) , and then multiplying through by f (j) , giving
This assumption about managers means that even though they incorrectly assess the true alphas of individual stocks, they correctly assess the true gross alphas of their portfolios.
Specifically, manager j knows by experience the value of λ (j) such that
Combining equations (11), (14), and (15) gives fee revenue as
8 which the manager maximizes by choosing φ
N and f (j) , subject to equation (9).
Skill and fees in the cross section
The partial equilibrium condition in equation (2) and the additional assumptions above deliver implications about the cross section of skill versus revenue as well as the role of the fee rate.
Differences in fee revenue across managers
The following proposition reveals what drives differences in fee revenue across managers.
(Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.) Proposition 1. Manager j's fee revenue in equilibrium is given by
and
where V m is the value of the stock market (N p m ). The moments Var * (·) and Cov * (·, ·)
denote the cross-sectional variance and covariance of stock-specific quantities, defined across the N stocks using the stocks' market-capitalization weights (i.e., the values of p i /V m as probabilities). The manager's choice of the fee rate, f (j) , does not affect the equilibrium
We see from the above that differences in fee revenue across managers depend solely on ρ (j) , the correlation across stocks between the manager's assessed alphas and the true alphas (with correlation defined over the value-weight measure). This correlation captures the manager's revenue-relevant skill. The higher is ρ (j) , the more skilled is the manager in assessing relative alphas across stocks. Managers with greater skill earn more fee revenue than those with less skill. This implication is consistent with the empirical evidence of Berk 9 and van Binsbergen (2015) . They find that, in a sample of over 6,000 active equity mutual funds, greater fee revenue is collected by funds exhibiting greater skill. They measure a fund's skill as its estimated "value added," the fund's assets under management (AUM) times the fund's alpha gross of its fee rate. Fund j's value added is thus
, which under the equilibrium condition in equation (2) is simply equal to F (j) . Crosssectional differences in value added, given the latter's equivalence to fee revenue in this setting, therefore perfectly correlate with managers' skills in assessing stock's true alphas.
Equation (17) shows that those alphas by themselves also play a role in the manager's value added, via the quantity ψ.
The value of ψ, the true alphas' cross-sectional variance (defined over the value-weight measure), captures the revenue-relevant mispricing present in equilibrium. The larger is the variance of the α i 's, the greater are the relative deviations of p i fromp i , as is evident from equation (5). Equation (17) shows that, ceteris paribus, greater equilibrium mispricing is accompanied by higher fee revenue for all managers, as ψ is not manager-specific. The equilibrium analyzed thus far is a partial one, however, in that equilibrium prices, and thus the determinants of ψ, are not addressed. One of those determinants is the collective skill of active management as an industry, as shown in the general equilibrium analyzed later.
Portfolio weights and fee rates
The following proposition reveals the role played by the manager's fee rate, f (j) , and why it is irrelevant for equilibrium fee revenue, F (j) .
Proposition 2. Manager j's active weight in stock i is
Trading costs equal fee revenue in equilibrium,
and the gross alpha is twice the fee rate,
The value of λ (j) , defined in equation (15), is given by
The irrelevance of f (j) for the equilibrium F (j) means that raising f (j) simply gives the manager proportionately lower W (j) to manage. In managing that lower W (j) , we see from equation (20) that the manager simply scales up all of the active weights in proportion to the higher fee rate f (j) . The dollar sizes of the active positions, and thus total trading costs, are unaffected. The fund's portfolio becomes less diversified, however, in the sense that the portfolio weights depart more from benchmark weights. Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2019) find empirically that among active equity mutual funds, those with a higher f (j) , measured as the expense ratio, tend to be less diversified in this sense, consistent with this implied tradeoff. That study also finds a negative correlation between f (j) and
, consistent with the product of those quantities, fee revenue, being more fundamentally relevant than either quantity individually. Berk and Green (2004) include a setting that also implies the fee rate's irrelevance and its inverse relation to departures from benchmark weights.
Skill and fees of the industry in general equilibrium
To analyze a general equilibrium, I make further assumptions, all of which are nested in the setting presented thus far. The most notable is to assume that all active managers are equally skilled, in a manner specified below. Abstracting from cross-manager differences sharpens the focus on overall industry skill, in addition to making the equilibrium solution tractable.
Additional assumptions
The number of active managers in the model, M , while finite, is sufficiently large to maintain the earlier assumption that each manager takes stock prices as given. Intermediaries receive the trading costs incurred by active managers but otherwise play no role. Noise traders own fraction h of total stock-market wealth and invest through neither the M active managers nor index funds. Investors own the remaining fraction 1 − h of stock-market wealth. They invest in the stock market only through the active managers and index funds. Passive managers offer a zero-cost market-index fund that invests any money the investors do not allocate to active managers.
Who are the noise traders? They can be individuals who invest directly in stocks without involving professional managers, such as in Stambaugh (2014) . They can also represent professional managers with negative gross alpha who nevertheless receive money from unwitting investors similar to the "noise allocators" in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) . Such managers are not included in the model's M active managers, as each of the latter instead has a zero net alpha in equilibrium. Also, the money placed with any negative-gross-alpha managers is included in the fraction h of stock-market wealth owned by noise-traders, not in the remaining fraction 1 − h owned by the model's investors.
Let φ H,i denote the weight on stock i in the aggregate portfolio of the noise traders, with φ H,i assumed to be exogenous and non-negative (no short selling by the noise traders). The price of stock i that would arise in an equilibrium with no active management, with prices thus determined solely by the asset demands of noise traders, is equal tô
Note thatp i does not depend on h, the fraction of the market owned by noise traders. That is, even a small presence of noise traders could distort prices significantly in the absence of active management.
I assume that manager j's assessment of the fair price for stock i obeys
with 0 ≤ ν 1 < 1 and ν 2 > 0. The ζ (j)
i 's are purely idiosyncratic across both stocks and managers and cross-sectionally independent of both thep i 's andp i 's. For a given manager j, the ζ (j) i 's have zero mean and unit variance across stocks. The overall market remains correctly valued, with
Although managers' beliefs differ from each other to at least some degree, because ν 2 > 0, managers are equally skilled in that the exogenous parameters ν 1 and ν 2 are the same across managers. The skill with which managers assess stocks' fundamental values is decreasing in both ν 1 and ν 2 . The parameter ν 1 governs the extent to which noise-traders' demands also arise in the beliefs of active managers, as discussed earlier. The parameter ν 2 governs the magnitudes of manager-specific limitations and mistakes.
Equilibrium conditions
An equilibrium occurs when, simultaneously, 1. for each manager j, the choices of φ
N , and f (j) satisfy the manager's maximization of fee revenue, F (j) ,
α (j)
A = 0 holds for each manager, and 3. stock prices, {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N } satisfy the market-clearing condition
where
is the stock's weight in the aggregate stock portfolio of the noise traders, and φ S,i is the stock's weight in investors' aggregate stock portfolio (which combines the index fund with the aggregate active portfolio).
Implications
The following proposition characterizes the stock prices and fee revenue that satisfy equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, ρ (j) andψ (j) are identical across managers and denoted as ρ andψ. Fee revenue is identical across managers, given by
and the ratio of aggregate fee revenue to the total value of the stock market is
The price of stock i is given by
where the scalar, θ, equal across stocks, is the solution to
The value of the skill measure, ρ, is given by
For a given quantitative specification of the noise-trader demands, as provided in the next section, the value of the scalar θ can be obtained by solving equation (32) numerically.
The general equilibrium reveals the role of skill in price correction. As shown earlier, a partial equilibrium is sufficient to show that ρ captures each manager's fee-relevant skill, conditional on a given amount of equilibrium mispricing. Of course, that property of ρ still holds in the general equilibrium. In the latter, however, the amount of mispricing depends on skill as well. Each manager, being one of many, takes prices as given when making decisions, but the skill all managers apply to those decisions affects how much mispricing survives in equilibrium. The amount of mispricing that is relevant for fee revenue is captured by ψ. Note from equation (34) that ψ depends on θ, which from equation (31) is the fraction of mispricing that survives, relative to the mispricing that would prevail in the absence of active management. The solution for θ in turn depends on both ν 1 and ν 2 , the parameters that govern the skill with which managers assess fundamental value, via equation (26). The next section illustrates that the product ψρ 2 in equation (29) can either increase or decrease in response to a simultaneous increase in ρ and decrease in ψ. In other words, fee revenue need not increase with skill.
Although both ν 1 and ν 2 matter for θ, note from equation (26) that prices do not contain any of the manager-specific noise given by the last term in equation (26). That noise washes out of the ratio of one active weight to another in the aggregate portfolio of active managers, but the presence of such noise does impact the magnitudes of those weights and thus the degree of price correction.
Useful for the later quantitative analysis is a measure that summarizes the size of the active positions in the aggregate portfolio of active managers. The first step in construct-ing such a measure is to obtain that portfolio's active weights, provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The active weight on stock i in the aggregate portfolio of active managers is given by
wheref is the harmonic mean of fee rates,
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) propose active share as a measure summarizing the degree to which a portfolio's weights deviate from those of a benchmark portfolio. Their definition of active share applied to the aggregate active portfolio, with respect to the market benchmark, is given by
Substituting the expression for φ i in equation (37) gives
Multiplying AS by the amount of money allocated to active management, W , puts the economic magnitude of active share in dollar terms, what might be termed "active position."
For a given set of active portfolio weights, active management's impact on equilibrium prices is greater the larger the amount of money being deployed at those weights. Applying equation (29),
Dividing W × AS by N p m gives the active position as a fraction of the total value of the stock market,
The value of AP , which essentially gauges the size of active management's trading footprint on the market, proves useful in understanding the amount of price correction that active management effects.
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5. Quantitative analysis
Parameter specifications
The main task in parameterizing the model is specifying the exogenous noise-trader demands.
The approach here follows that in Stambaugh (2014) . First, the price and payoff of each stock i are normalized by expected end-of-period value, so thatx i =x m , and thusp i = p m . The relative pricing error (p i −p i )/p m appearing in the mispricing measure ψ in equation (34) is then given by
using equation (25). The mispricing measure ψ in equation (34) can then be written as
Similarly, equation (35) can then be written as
I assume that the number of stocks, N , is large enough such that the cross-sectional distribution of the v i 's is well approximated by a continuous distribution for the random variable, v. Specifically, I assume a Weibull distribution for v. The distribution is defined for v ≥ 0, consistent with the assumption that noise-traders do not short. The Weibull distribution has two parameters, determining the distribution's scale and shape. 4 Because N i=1 φ H,i = 1, the scale is determined by E(v) = 1, so there is one free parameter k that determines the distribution's shape. As k becomes large, the density concentrates around v = 1, yielding the completely diversified portfolio that puts equal weights on all stocks. As k becomes small, the mass concentrates toward zero and skewness increases, corresponding to an undiversified portfolio that puts low weights on most stocks and large weights on a relative few. Figure 1 displays densities under alternative values of k.
As Stambaugh (2014) discusses, numerous studies report evidence indicating that direct holdings of individuals are quite undiversified and exhibit significant commonality across individuals.
5 Commonality in holdings limits the extent to which the low diversification by individuals washes out when their holdings are aggregated, making the relatively low values of k plausible to the extent that noise trading reflects direct holdings by individuals. In contrast, an absence of commonality among noise traders implies a distribution of their aggregate weights across stocks similar to the density displayed in Figure 1 for k = 20, corresponding to a relatively well diversified portfolio. In the quantitative analysis here, I
set k = 1 but explore sensitivity to variation between k = 0.5 and k = 2.
The analogs of equations (45) and (46) in terms of the continuous v are
Applying equation (25) and the same normalization as above in whichp i = p m allows active position in equation (42) to be written as
and the analog in terms of the continuous v becomes
The errors in managers' expectations are governed by the parameters ν 1 and ν 2 in equation (26). Recall that ν 1 is the fraction of noise-trader demands that pervade managers' expectations. Values of ν 1 entertained below cover this parameter's entire permissible range, 0 ≤ ν 1 < 1. The value of ν 2 governs the magnitude of managers' idiosyncratic expectation errors, and recall ν 2 > 0. Because the ζ (j)
i 's have unit variance across stocks, ν 2 represents a manager's typical valuation error relative to correct fundamental value. For much of the analysis below, the value of ν 2 ranges from 0.01 to 0.50, corresponding to typical valuation errors between 1% and 50% of fundamental value. In one case, however, much larger values of ν 2 are entertained, in order to explore more fully the effects of this component of managers' skill.
The other parameters to be specified are the fraction of the stock market owned by noise traders, h, the trading cost parameter, c, the number of active managers, M , and one plus the discount rate for stocks, µ. I set h = 0.25 but explore sensitivity to variation between 0 and 0.5. Noise traders are often viewed as individuals who invest directly on their own. As discussed by Stambaugh (2014) , who incorporates estimates reported by French (2008) , the fraction of the equity market owned directly by individuals has trended steadily downward over the decades, from nearly 0.50 in 1980 to less than 0.20 in recent years. For trading costs, I set c = 1 but explore sensitivity to variation between 0.25 and 2.50. With c = 1, the proportional cost of trading a given amount of a stock is equal to that amount's fraction of the stock's total market capitalization. The number of managers is set at M = 3000, but I explore sensitivity to variation between 500 and 5000. Finally, I set µ = 1.065, with 6.5% being roughly the average stock-market return over recent decades, but plausible variation in this parameter has negligible effects.
Verifying a unique solution to equation (32) 
Equilibrium outcomes
5.2.1. Fee revenue, skill, and mispricing Figure 2 illustrates the study's main result. The figure plots active management's fee revenue versus ν 1 , with revenue stated as a fraction of the stock-market's total value, given by Π in equation (30). Recall that a higher value of ν 1 means that the beliefs of active managers contain more of the same noise present in the demands of noise traders. A higher ν 1 thus means managers have less skill in assessing stocks' fundamental values. Observe that fee revenue is hump shaped with respect to ν 1 . In particular, as ν 1 increases from zero to about 0.6, fee revenue increases from less than 50 basis points of the stock-market's capitalization to over 250 basis points. Not until managers' beliefs are quite strongly in sympathy with noise-trader demands does a further decline in skill erode revenue. We also see that fee revenue is higher for the larger of the two values for ν 2 . Recall that a higher ν 2 also means less skill, as it corresponds to higher variance of the idiosyncratic noise in managers' beliefs.
Overall, Figure 2 strikingly illustrates that greater skill for the industry can result in less revenue.
Define the market share of active management as the ratio of its size (AUM) to the total amount invested with both active and passive managers. In the model, the latter amount is the total value of the stock market times the fraction of the market owned by investors, 1 − h. Recall that active management's fee revenue, as opposed to its AUM, is the quantity determined uniquely in equilibrium. The AUM is simply fee revenue divided by the average fee rate,f . Therefore, dividing the quantity on the vertical axis of Figure 2 (fee revenue as a fraction of the stock-market's value) byf (1 − h) gives active management's market share. Iff and h are held fixed, then the model's implications about market share mirror those plotted for fee revenue. Suppose, for example, thatf = 0.012, the average expense ratio for active equity mutual funds reported by Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2019) , and recall the earlier specification of h = 0.25. Then if ν 2 stays fixed at 0.01 but ν 1 drops from 0.10 to 0.05, thereby raising skill, the market share of active management drops from roughly 100% to 75% (corresponding to a drop on Figure 2 's vertical axis from about 0.01 to 0.007).
The basic intuition behind the potentially negative effect of increased skill on fee revenue (or market share) is illustrated by the two panels of Figure 3 . Equilibrium fee revenue in equation (29) depends on ρ and ψ, both of which are endogenous equilibrium quantities.
The degree of managerial skill relevant to fee revenue is summarized by ρ, the correlation between each manager's assessed alphas on individual stocks and the stocks' true alphas.
The amount of fee-relevant mispricing is summarized by ψ, which reflects the magnitudes of stocks' true alphas, as summarized their cross-sectional variance. (Recall that correlation and variance here are with respect to the value-weight measure.) Panel A of Figure 3 confirms that as ν 1 increases, skill as captured by ρ decreases. At the same time, however, more skill results in more price correction. We see in Panel B that the degree of equilibrium mispricing, captured by ψ, does indeed increase as ν 1 increases (and skill declines). These two effects of skill-more accurate alpha assessments versus lower alpha magnitudes-affect fee revenue in opposite directions. Their net effect on fee revenue depends on the product ψρ 2 , as shown by the equilibrium value of F in equation (29). Over much of the range for ν 1 , Figure 2 reveals that as skill decreases, the decline in ρ is outweighed by the increase in ψ, and thus fee revenue increases. That is, in the determination of equilibrium fee revenue, the weaker price correction more than offsets managers' worse assessments of alphas.
Skill's role in equilibrium price correction can be understood further from Figure 4 . Panel A displays the effect of ν 1 on the quantity 1 − θ, which from equation (31) is the fraction of noise-trader distortions of prices that active management eliminates. As ν 1 goes from zero to one, 1 − θ goes from almost one to a value of zero. This near-linear decline in the fraction of price correction is echoed in Panel B by a near-linear decline in active position, the value of AP in equation (50). The latter quantity drops from roughly 9% of the stock market's value at ν 1 = 0 to a zero active position at ν 1 = 1. As managers become less skilled, their aggregate active position declines monotonically, resulting in correspondingly less correction of noise-trader distortions of prices.
The plots in Figures 2 through 4 display results under two values of ν 2 , the standard deviation of the manager-specific valuation errors in equation (7). Throughout those plots, the higher value of ν 2 , 0.50, gives greater fee revenue than does the lower value, 0.01. Panel A of Figure 5 plots fee revenue for the entire range of ν 2 up to that higher value of 0.50.
Throughout that range, fee revenue increases as that dimension of skill decreases, i.e, as ν 2 increases. As shown in Figure 1 , for sufficiently high values of ν 1 , fee revenue is decreasing in ν 1 . Is the same true for ν 2 ? The answer is yes, as revealed in Panel B of Figure 5 , but very large values of ν 2 are required before revenue becomes increasing in this dimension of skill, i.e., decreasing in ν 2 . For both of the ν 1 values (0.05 and 0.10), fee revenue doesn't become decreasing in ν 2 until ν 2 reaches values of roughly 40, corresponding to a 4000% standard deviation of relative valuation errors. For practical purposes in the setting analyzed here, fee revenue increases as managers' idiosyncratic assessments of fair value become noisier. Trading costs, which present each fund manager with decreasing returns to scale, are another essential component of the model. When c in equation (1) is higher, the cost of trading a given amount of stock is higher. Panel C reveals that an increase in c has a negligible (barely visible) positive effect on fee revenue when ν 2 = 0.01, but that positive effect is stronger when ν 2 = 0.50. Although the idiosyncratic noise in managers' beliefs, governed by ν 2 , washes out of the aggregate active position, higher trading costs cause each manager's positions to be less aggressive, and thereby cause the aggregate active position to be less aggressive. As a result, more of the noise-trader distortions survive in equilibrium, leaving greater mispricing. The latter means greater fee revenue at the skill levels considered.
Robustness to parameter specifications
The same trading-cost channel is at work in Panel D of Figure 6 , which shows that fee revenue declines as the number of managers, M , increases. This negative effect is barely visible when ν 2 = 0.01, but it is stronger when ν 2 = 0.50. Managers are competitive price takers at all values of M , but when more of them compete, each essentially receives less money to manage (for a given distribution of fee rates). Trading smaller dollar amounts lowers proportional trading costs, so raising M essentially plays the same role as lowering c. The latter statement can made more precise by noting that c and M enter Π, the ratio of fee revenue to stock-market value plotted in Figure 6 , only as the ratio M/c, appearing in equations (30) and (33). Given the results in Panels C and D of Figure 6 , we see Π is decreasing in M/c.
Potential endogeneity of trading costs and the number of managers
Both the trading-cost parameter, c, and the number of active managers, M , are treated as exogenous in the equilibrium analysis. An alternative treatment could have one or both quantities depend endogenously on managers' skill. For example, greater skill could imply greater information asymmetry between managers and intermediaries, potentially increasing what an intermediary charges a manager to trade a given amount of a stock. Such a channel is somewhat similar to that analyzed by Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012) , who show that an "arms race" to acquire skill by competing financial firms works to those firms' collective disadvantage due to adverse-selection concerns under information asymmetry.
As discussed above, a higher value of the trading-cost parameter, c, implies a higher amount of fee revenue for active managers. Therefore, an endogenous increase in c can weaken or reverse a drop in fee revenue that, as shown earlier, can otherwise accompany an increase in managers' skill. The magnitude of this potential effect of c does not appear to be large, however. First recall from Panel C of Figure 6 that, when the skill parameter ν 2 is only 0.01, fee revenue is virtually flat over values of c ranging from 0.25 to 2.5. When ν 2 is instead 0.50, meaning a manager's idiosyncratic valuation error is typically 50% of a stock's value, fee revenue is more steeply increasing in c. Nevertheless, observe in Panel C that if ν 1 drops from 0.10 to 0.05, thereby halving the fraction of noise-trader demands contaminating managers' beliefs, this increase in skill still implies lower fee revenue even if c increases tenfold, from 0.25 to 2.5.
The number of active managers, M , could also depend on managers' skill. If an increase in skill can bring less aggregate fee revenue, as shown earlier, that lower fee revenue could induce manager exits. Such exits could occur, for example, due to managers' fixed costs. 
Conclusions
Suppose that the active management industry has become more skilled over time, as suggested by the findings of Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) . They estimate a proxy for skill and observe that its distribution across managers trends upward over the past three decades. In other words, that study's evidence suggests the active management industry has become more skilled. The authors suggest education and technology, for example, could be part of the story. One might even construe the recent trend toward quantitatively managed "smart-beta" products as a self-proclaimed increase in the industry's skill (or at least its "smartness"). The results here show that an increase in overall skill can imply a smaller equilibrium amount of fee revenue.
If greater skill spells less revenue, an upward trend in skill represents a potential challenge for the active management industry in addition to that discussed by Stambaugh (2014) : the downward trend in direct equity ownership by individuals, a potential source of noise trading.
That is, if not only the presence of noise traders declines, but the mispricing they induce is more skillfully identified, then active management can face a doubly strong headwind in maintaining its presence in the money management industry. Of course an industry of competing active managers cannot decide to calm that headwind by becoming less skilled.
Applying more skill is in each manager's individual interest, because more-skilled managers make more than less-skilled managers, as also implied by the model presented here.
Fee revenue can decline through a loss of AUM, a drop in the fee rate, or both. The product of those quantities, fee revenue, is what the model's equilibrium determines uniquely. In fact both the AUM market share and the typical fee rate for active management have declined over recent decades, as noted by Stambaugh (2014) . In the case of equity mutual funds, for example, over the period from 2000 to 2018, active management lost 20% in market share while essentially reducing its fee rate by 30 basis points.
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For settings in which there is a negative relation between skill and industry size, there is at least an imperfect analogy to the situation faced by any industry that gets more efficient at producing a good or service for which the capacity to consume is relatively constrained. The more efficient the industry becomes in exploiting its productive resources, the less of those resources it needs to employ. A notable example comes from agriculture, where efficiency gains play a big role in that sector's employing a much smaller share of the U.S. labor force than it once did (e.g., Dimitri, Effland, and Conklin, 2005) . The capacity for consuming the active management industry's output is constrained in the sense that the industry can go no further than to drive its equilibrium net alpha to zero. Being more skilled in identifying mispriced assets can enable the industry to accomplish that job with less resources.
Even though the industry can earn less by becoming better at what it does, the model does imply that greater skill produces stronger price correction in stocks. With this positive externality, there can still be a societal benefit to having active managers be more skilled. Having prices more accurately reflect underlying fundamentals can allow more efficient resource allocations.
with the second equality applying equation (A6). Substituting the right-hand side of that second equality for φ (j) P −1 φ (j) in equation (A1) and again applying equation (A6) gives
To obtain λ (j) , first substitute the right-hand side of equation (A7) for φ (j) P −1 φ (j) in equation (A5) and simplify, again using equation (A6), to obtain
Multiplying both sides of equation (A10) by α gives
and the condition in equation (15) therefore implies
Substituting the right-hand side of equation (A12) for λ (j) in equation (A8) gives, after rearranging,
The equivalance of equation (A13) to the result stated in the proposition is easily seen by noting that the value-weighted α i 's andα
and therefore
Proof of Proposition 2: Equation (20) and from equation (A16) for
. From equations (13), (A7) and (A8) and the relation
giving equation (22). If trading costs equal fee revenue, then (12) . Applying the condition in equation (2) then implies that g (j) = 2f (j) , giving equation (23). Equation (24) is equivalent to equation (A12), noting the relations in equations (A16) and (A17).
Proof of Proposition 3: I conjecture an equilibrium in which the moments in equations (A16) and (A17), and thus the quantities λ (j) and ρ (j) , are equal across managers, and then I verify that these conditions are satisfied by the resulting equilibrium prices. Define
. Let φ i denote the weight on stock i in the aggregate active portfolio,
The total stock-market wealth of investors is (1 − h)N p m , and thus φ S,i in equation (28) equals
Substituting into equation (28) gives
or, using equation (A19),
Multiplying through by N p m and using equation (A19) gives
Combining equations (A8) and (A9), noting
where the last equality uses equation (6) and the assumption that λ (j) = λ. Substituting into equation (A23), using equation (26), and noting that the idiosyncratic ζ (j)
i 's average to zero across managers,
Equation (A25) can then be rearranged as
Next is to verify that with equilibrium prices of the form in equation (A26), the moments in equations (A16) and (A17), and thus the quantities λ (j) and ρ (j) , are equal across managers, as conjectured. First note, using equation (5) and the definition of ψ in equation (18) that
which is the same as equation (34). Proceeding similarly using equation (6) and the definition ofψ (j) in equation (21) gives
which is identical across j and the same as equation (35). The equality in (A30) follows from the assumption that the ζ (j)
i 's are independent of thep i 's andp i 's across i, so that the mean of the product is the product of the means. Applying again the assumed idiosyncratic properties of the ζ (j) i 's along with equations (5) and (6) and the definition of ρ (j) in equation
which is also identical across j. Equation (36) 
which when substituted into equation (A28) gives equation (33).
Proof of Proposition 4:
From the previous proposition, all managers earn the same equilibrium fee revenue, F , so
withf defined in equation (38) . Using these weights along with previous results gives
α (j) P α Pα Figure 3 . Fund skill and stock mispricing versus ν 1 . The parameter ν 1 represents the fraction of noise-trader distortions present in active manager's beliefs, ν 2 is the standard deviation of each manager's idiosyncratic deviations of beliefs relative to fundamental value, ρ reflects skill, and ψ reflects mispricing. Figure 6 . Fee revenue versus k, h, c, and M . The dispersion and skewness in noisetraders's demands are decreasing in the parameter k; h is the fraction of the market owned by noise traders; proportional stock-trading costs increase in the parameter c; M is the number of active managers. The parameter ν 1 represents the fraction of noise-trader distortions present in active manager's beliefs, and ν 2 is the standard deviation of each manager's idiosyncratic deviations of beliefs relative to fundamental value.
